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I. REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT BASED ON
COMPLETE PREEMPTION IN AVIATION CASES
THE CASES discussed herein from 2002 address the issue of
complete preemption. In analyzing the cases, it is helpful to
bear in mind the difference between complete preemption and
ordinary preemption. Ordinary preemption is a defense to the
merits of the claim asserted when the plaintiffs state law causes
of action are displaced by federal law. Complete preemption,
on the other hand, is a jurisdictional term used only in connec-
tion with federal court removals. It identifies areas of federal
law that completely preempt state law so that federal jurisdiction
is created merely by pleading a claim that ventures into the
field. ERISA and labor law are two universally recognized areas
of complete preemption. The following cases illustrate the con-
tinuing debate in federal courts as to whether the Warsaw Con-
vention' and the Federal Aviation Act2 also completely preempt
the field for removal purposes.
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2001) [hereinafter Warsaw
Convention].
2 Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2003).
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A. WARSAW CONVENTION REMOVALS
Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc.3
The issue of complete preemption under the Warsaw Conven-
tion has recently been addressed in three American Airlines
cases removed to the Dallas Division of the Northern District of
Texas. In Rogers, American removed a case from state court on
the basis that the plaintiffs claim was completely preempted by
the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiffs petition alleged only
state law claims arising from passport difficulties encountered by
a passenger on a trip to Japan. The plaintiff did not specifically
plead or attempt to invoke any federal claims.4
Under most circumstances, of course, a defendant cannot re-
move a case based on the existence of a federal defense.5 The
fact that the Warsaw Convention may preempt state law claims
does not create a basis for removal unless the Warsaw Conven-
tion is among that handful of federal remedies (like ERISA) that
completely preempt the field.6
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has a stringent test for
complete preemption. Among other factors, the test requires a
clear expression from Congress not merely to preempt a field in
state law, but to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from
state to federal courts.7 Since the district court could find no
such expression of congressional intent, it remanded the case.'
DeGeorge v. American Airlines, Inc.9
This narrow view of preemption is not shared by the Southern
District of New York. In DeGeorge, plaintiffs brought suit in Dal-
las state court for damages arising from the November 2001
crash of Flight 587, an A300 bound fromJFK to Santo Domingo.
American removed the case to the Northern District of Texas,
where it was transferred to the Southern District of New York as
part of the multi-district litigation (MDL) arising from that
crash. Once the case was in New York, plaintiffs moved to re-
mand the case on the grounds that the Warsaw Convention does
3 Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 661 (N.D. Tex. 2001).
4 Id. at 663-64.
5 Id. at 664.
6 Id.; see alsoJohnson v. Baylor Univ., 214 F.3d 630, 632 (5th Cir.), cert denied,
531 U.S. 1012 (2000).
7 Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 671 (citing Johnson, 214 F.3d at 632).
8 Id. at 672.
" DeGeorge v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 4765(RWS), 1448(RWS), 2002
WL 31356266 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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not give rise to removal jurisdiction. 10 The Southern District of
New York rejected the rationale set forth in Rogers. Noting that
it was not bound by Fifth Circuit precedent, the Southern Dis-
trict of New York held that the Warsaw Convention completely
preempted state law causes of action and was an appropriate ba-
sis for removal."
Perez v. American Airlines, Inc.
12
Shortly after DeGeorge was removed from Dallas state court,
American removed Perez to the Northern District of Texas. This
case was also transferred conditionally to the MDL court, the
Southern District of New York. Before the transfer order took
effect, however, plaintiffs persuaded the federal court in Dallas
to stay the order so that it could review jurisdiction. 3 Based on
the rationale of Rogers, the Northern District of Texas held that
the Warsaw Convention did not create removal jurisdiction. It
remanded the case to state court. 4
Fournier v. Lufthansa German Airlines5
The issue of complete preemption under the Warsaw Conven-
tion was also addressed, but not decided, in two cases in the
Northern District of Illinois. In Fournier, the carrier removed a
case filed by a passenger who was arrested in Greece as a result
of a series of misunderstandings that the court charitably called
"an air travel debacle." The passenger was a physician traveling
from Chicago to Athens carrying two ornamental handguns in
his checked luggage. The handguns were properly declared at
the time the passenger checked-in for his flight and were ac-
cepted for transport by Lufthansa. Unfortunately, the box carry-
ing the handguns was delayed in transit. When the box arrived
in Athens, it was brought through customs by a Lufthansa agent
who did not declare the contents. Apparently, the guns were
thereafter discovered by customs. The Lufthansa agents in Ath-
ens disclaimed any knowledge that the box contained firearms.
When the passenger arrived to claim his lost bag, he was ar-
10 Id. at *1-2.
11 Id. at *5 (citing Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 670-71).
12 Perez v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 3:012-CV-1235-G, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26624 (N.D. Tex. 2002).
13 Id. at *2-3.
14 Id. at *6-11 (citing Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 670-71).
15 Id.; Fournier v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 191 F. Supp. 2d 996 (N.D. Ill.
2002).
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rested by Greek police, convicted of gun smuggling, and sen-
tenced to 16 months in prison."
Upon his return to the United States, the passenger filed suit
against Lufthansa in Cook County based on a number of state
claims. Lufthansa removed the case to federal court on the
grounds of complete preemption by the Warsaw Convention,
the Federal Aviation Act, and the Airline Deregulation Act. 17
The federal court held that neither the Airline Deregulation Act
nor the Federal Aviation Act created removal jurisdiction.I8 The
court did not reach the issue of whether complete preemption
applied to the Warsaw Convention, since Lufthansa did not of-
fer sufficient evidence to satisfy the court that the passenger's
claims were subject to the Convention. The case was remanded
to state court.19
Dorazio v. United Airlines, Corp.20
In Dorazio, plaintiffs brought suit in Cook County for injuries
allegedly sustained when their international flight was sprayed
with pesticide. United initially defended the case in state court,
but removed it seven months after suit was filed on the basis of
complete preemption by the Warsaw Convention.2 The North-
ern District of Illinois once again declined to address whether
preemption by the Warsaw Convention created removal jurisdic-
tion, holding instead that United's removal would be untimely
even if complete preemption existed. This case was also re-
manded to state court.22
B. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT AND AiRLINE DEREGULATION
ACT REMOVALS
Curtin v. Port Authority23
The Southern District of New York held last year that the Fed-
eral Aviation Act completely preempts state law, providing a ve-
hicle to remove a case to federal court. In Curtin, the plaintiff
brought suit in state court against Delta Airlines and the New
York Port Authority for injuries allegedly sustained during an
emergency evacuation of an aircraft. The defendants removed
10 Id. at 999.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 1003.
19 Id. at 1005.
20 Dorazio v. UAL Corp., No. 02 C 3689, 2002 WL 31236290 (N.D. Il. 2002).
21 Id. at *1.
22 Id. at *3-4.
23 Curtin v. Port Auth., 183 F. Supp. 2d 664 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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the case to federal court on the grounds that the plaintiffs
claims were completely preempted by the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958.24 The court engaged in a lengthy analysis of the Fed-
eral Aviation Act and the complete preemption doctrine.25 The
courtjoined the First and Third Circuit Courts of Appeal in con-
cluding that Congress intended to completely occupy the field
of aviation safety, thus creating federal question jurisdiction for
removal purposes.2 6
Maitra v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries27
District courts in the Fifth Circuit, however, seem to consist-
ently reach the opposite conclusion. The latest of several cases
on this issue from district courts in Texas is Maitra, a case arising
from a general aviation accident in which two people died. Suit
was filed in Texas state court and removed by one defendant,
partially on the basis that the plaintiffs claims were completely
preempted by the Federal Aviation Act.28 The district court rec-
ognized that there was some disagreement among the circuits
on this point, but noted that district courts in the Fifth Circuit
have consistently rejected the argument. Under Fifth Circuit
precedent, complete preemption requires a removing defen-
dant to establish clear Congressional intent to completely sup-
plant state law. The district court held that the defendants had
failed to demonstrate that intent by Congress. 2' Finding no ba-
sis for federal jurisdiction, the case was remanded to state
court.30
Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express"
The Ninth Circuit also held last year that the Airline Deregu-
lation Act does not completely preempt state law. In Wayne, the
defendant air shipping company removed a class action lawsuit
filed against it for trade practices involving the sale of cargo in-
surance. The removal was based on complete preemption
under the Airline Deregulation Act. The district court agreed
with the defendant, denied the motion to remand, and dis-
24 Id. at 666.
25 Id. at 667-72.
26 Id. at 670-71.
27 Maitra v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., No. Civ. A. SA.O1CA0209FBNN, 2002 WL
1491855 (W.D. Tex. 2002).
28 Id. at *1.
29 Id. at *6.
30o Id. at *8.
31 Wayne v. DHL Worldwide Express, 294 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2002).
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missed the plaintiffs claim.32 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
briefly analyzed the Airline Deregulation Act, contrasting it with
ERISA. The court concluded, without much discussion, that the
ADA was not the kind of comprehensive regulatory scheme that
gave rise to complete preemption. The case was remanded to
state court.
3 3
Kingsley v. Lania 4
Complete preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act was
also rejected last year by district courts in Massachusetts and the
Northern District of Illinois. In Kingsley, Delta removed a case to
the District of Massachusetts involving a passenger dispute dur-
ing pre-flight screening.3 5 Finding that the Airline Deregulation
Act was not sufficiently, comprehensive to support a claim of
complete preemption, the court remanded the case to state
court.
3 16
Smith v. United Airlines, Inc.37
Similarly, in Smith, a case was removed to the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois involving a passenger injury from luggage falling
out of an overhead bin. United argued that the plaintiffs claim
was completely preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, sup-
porting removal jurisdiction. The district court remanded the
case, finding that the Airline Deregulation Act did not contain a
civil remedy provision or create a private cause of action, thus
precluding any argument in favor of complete preemption.3
II. ORDINARY PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW CLAIMS IN
AVIATION CASES
As discussed above, ordinary preemption is a defense to the
merits of a claim that can be raised in state or federal court,
regardless of whether the case can be removed. The following
cases address ordinary preemption - the extent to which a fed-
eral statute displaces state law.
32 Id. at 1181-82.
33 Id. at 1184-85.
34 Kinglsey v. Lania, 221 F. Supp. 2d 93 (D. Mass. 2002).
35 Id. at 94-95.
36 Id. at 98-99.
37 Smith v. United Airlines, Inc., No. 00 C 50373N, 2002 WL 31236392 (N.D.
I1. 2002).
38 Id. at *1-2.
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A. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc. 9
In Lyn-Lea Travel Corp., the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ex-
amined the scope of the Airline Deregulation Act's (ADA) pre-
emption in a contractual dispute between a travel agency and an
airline. The plaintiff travel agency had a contract with American
to use its Sabre Computer Reservation System. The lease agree-
ment required the agency to book at least 1200 transactions per
month over the system. After entering into the Sabre contract,
American reduced its domestic commission rate, allegedly caus-
ing harm to the travel agency's business. Eventually, the travel
agency refused to pay American for the use of Sabre, and Ameri-
can pulled the equipment out of the agency.4 °
The agency filed suit in Texas state court, claiming that Amer-
ican's actions caused the agency to lose some of its customers.
American filed a breach of contract counter-claim. In response
to the counter-claim, the agency raised the defense of fraudu-
lent inducement, claiming that it would not have signed a Sabre
contract had it known that American would soon lower its do-
mestic commissions. The district court held that the agency's
affirmative claims as well as its fraudulent inducement defense
were preempted by the ADA.41
The Fifth Circuit agreed that the travel agency's affirmative
claims were preempted by the ADA. The agency's claims were
based in large part on the business practices of American in set-
ting fares and commissions. Subjecting American to state com-
mon law in this area would regulate American's policies,
commission structure, and reservation practices. The ADA
preempts any state attempt to regulate such matters.4 2
The Fifth Circuit did not agree, however, with the district
court's disposition of the fraudulent inducement defense to
American's breach of contract counter-claim.43 In American Air-
lines v. Wolens, the United States Supreme Court held that the
ADA does not preempt application of state law to routine
breach of contract claims.44 Based on the holding in Wolens, the
39 Lyn-Lea Travel Corp. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 283 F.3d 282 (5th Cir. 2002).
40 Id. at 284-85.
41 Id. at 285.
42 Id. at 287-89.
43 Id. at 289.
44 Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232-33 (1995).
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Fifth Circuit ruled that defenses to an airline's affirmative
breach of contract claims are not preempted by the ADA.45
Botz v. Omni Air Int''6
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held this year that a
state's "whistleblower" statute was preempted by the ADA. In
Botz, suit was brought by a flight attendant who had been dis-
charged for refusing to accept a flight assignment that she be-
lieved violated federal "duty time" regulations. The flight
attendant maintained that her discharge was in retaliation for
reporting the alleged violation to her employer, and therefore,
constituted a violation of Minnesota's whistleblower statute.
This statute protects employees who in good faith report a possi-
ble violation of law or who refuse an assignment that the em-
ployee has an objective, factual basis to believe violates any law.47
The Eighth Circuit held that Minnesota's whistleblower stat-
ute had a direct connection to airline services, since it permitted
flight attendants to refuse assignments, thereby jeopardizing the
carrier's ability to complete its scheduled flights. The flight at-
tendant's claims, therefore, were preempted by the ADA.48
B. FEDERAL AVIATION REGULATIONS
Skysign International, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu4 9
The preemptive scope of Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) regulations was addressed in 2002 by the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Skysign International. The suit was filed by an
aerial advertising company, seeking a declaration that federal
law barred the city of Honolulu from regulating navigable air-
space by placing restrictions on aerial advertising.5" The Ninth
Circuit found that the FAA had a broad legislative grant to im-
plement regulations regarding the use of navigable airspace. It
further noted that it was within the FAA's statutory grant to
adopt regulations preempting the Honolulu ordinance at is-
sue. 5 1 The fact that the FAA has the power to preempt the ordi-
nance does not necessarily mean that it has preempted it. The
court held that the Honolulu ordinance at issue did not conflict
45 Lyn-Lea Travel, 283 F.3d at 289-90.
46 Botz v. Omni Air Int'l, 286 F.3d 488 (8th Cir. 2002).
47 Id. at 490-92 (discussing Minn. Stat §§ 181.931-935 (2000 & Supp. 2001)).
48 Botz, 286 F.3d at 498.
49 Skysign Int'l, Inc. v. City & County of Honolulu, 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir.
2002).
50 Id. at 1114-15.
51 Id. at 1116.
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with FAA air traffic regulations and, therefore, was not
preempted.52
C. WARSAW CONVENTION - PREEMPTION OF ANTI-
DISCRIMINATION STATUTES
The preemptive effect of the Warsaw Convention on discrimi-
nation claims has been the subject of several opinions this year.
It is clear from a review of these cases that the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1999 opinion in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,53 has
greatly enhanced the preemptive effect of the Warsaw Conven-
tion in any claim arising from international air transportation.
1. Preempted
King v. American Airlines, Inc.54
In King, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld dismissal
of a federal discrimination claim. Plaintiffs had been bumped
from an American Airlines flight between Miami and Freeport.
Thereafter, they brought suit against American under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 in the Northern District of New York for allegedly dis-
criminating against them based on their race. The Second Cir-
cuit held that discrimination claims arising in the course of
embarkation on an international flight are preempted by the
Warsaw Convention.55
Gibbs v. American Airlines, Inc.56
A similar conclusion was reached by a D.C. District Court in
Gibbs. This 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action was brought by a passenger
who was forcibly removed from an American flight between
Miami and Trinidad after he allegedly had an argument with a
flight attendant. The passenger claimed that his removal from
the aircraft was based on race. The district court discussed the
claim and held "that discrimination statutes are preempted...
under the [Warsaw] Convention. 57
2. Not Preempted
Dasrath v. Continental Airlines, Inc.58
52 Id. at 1118.
53 El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
54 King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2002).
55 Id. at 355, 358, 360.
56 Gibbs v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002).
57 Id. at 145-47, 149.
58 Dasrath v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 2d 531 (D.NJ. 2002).
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Dasrath involves a claim by foreign-born passengers removed
from a Continental flight between Newark and Tampa. The
three passengers were seated in the first class section of the air-
craft and had incited the suspicion of a white passenger seated
in coach, primarily because the three foreign-born passengers
were seated together and apparently were of Middle-Eastern ap-
pearance. The coach passenger reported her concerns to a
flight attendant and the three first class passengers were thereaf-
ter asked to leave the aircraft. Once the flight departed, it be-
came clear that these three passengers posed no risk: two were
University of South Florida colleagues who were connecting
from another Continental flight from London; the third was a
non-revenue passenger. The passengers brought suit against
Continental for alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. Significantly, the two
international passengers sought only injunctive relief 59
Faced with the broad reach of the Tseng preemption, and a
number of cases holding that discrimination claims were pre-
empted by the Warsaw Convention, the New Jersey District
Court focused on the fact that the plaintiffs were not seeking
monetary relief.6" The court decided that injunctive relief was
not preempted by Warsaw, based on the D.C. Circuit's opinion
in Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc.6 1 The district court has certified
the issue, however, for immediate appeal to the Third Circuit.
Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc.6 2
In Bayaa, the same conclusion regarding injunctive relief was
reached in an unpublished opinion in California.63 The recent
bankruptcy of United Airlines has stayed the case, so appellate
review of the decision by the Ninth Circuit may be postponed
indefinitely.
III. MISCELLANEOUS WARSAW LITIGATION
A. WHEN Is TURBULENCE AN ACCIDENT?
Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines4
59 Id. at 533-36.
60 Id. at 540-42.
61 Cruz v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 193 F.3d 526, 532 (D.D.C. 1999), remanded, 150 F.
Supp. 2d 103, 119 (D.D.C. 2001) (addressing comment for injunctive relief as
moot).
62 Bayaa v. United Airlines, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
63 Id. at 1202.
64 Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 181 F. Supp. 2d 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2002),
overruled by 339 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003).
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In the case of Magan v. Lufthansa German Airlines, the South-
ern District of New York adopted a bright line test this year for
determining when turbulence constitutes an accident under the
Warsaw Convention. The plaintiff was injured while walking
back to his seat from the lavatory during turbulence.
The court recognized that turbulence is neither an unex-
pected nor an unusual event in flight. At some point, however,
it can become so severe as to constitute an accident under the
Warsaw Convention. The court decided to adopt the FAA's tur-
bulence classification system as a means for deciding whether
turbulence encountered during a particular flight was sufficient
to create a Warsaw accident. Light and moderate turbulence
does not constitute an accident, while severe or extreme turbu-
lence qualifies as an accident. Using this classification system,
the court held that an aircraft involved in a Warsaw turbulence
accident must encounter turbulence that causes large, abrupt
changes in altitude or attitude, forcing occupants against seat
belts, and making it impossible for them to walk.
With this test in hand, the court granted the defendant's mo-
tion for summary judgment. Since the plaintiff was injured
while walking back to his seat during the turbulence event, the
court reasoned that the aircraft could not have been in severe
turbulence. One of the characteristics of severe turbulence
under the FAA classification system is the inability of occupants
to walk, which the plaintiff was doing at the time he was injured.
Brunk v. British Airways, PLC65
It remains to be seen whether the bright line test adopted by
the Southern District of New York in Magan will enjoy wide-
spread acceptance. The D.C. District Court rejected it in the
case of Brunk v. British Airways, PLC. As in Magan, the plaintiff
in Brunk was injured when the aircraft encountered turbulence
as she was returning to her seat from the lavatory.6 6
The Brunk court reviewed the bright line test adopted by
Magan, but declined to adopt that approach. The court felt that
adopting the test would require the court to legislate from the
bench. Instead, the D.C. District Court denied the defendant's
motion for summary judgment, reserving for the jury the ques-
tion of whether the turbulence encountered on the British Air-
65 Brunk v. British Airways, PLC, 195 F. Supp. 2d 130 (D.D.C. 2002).
66 Id. at 131.
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ways flight was sufficiently unexpected and unusual to constitute
an accident under Warsaw.
67
B. IN-FLIGHT PASSENGER ILLNESS AS A WARSAW ACCIDENT
It is well established that a passenger's internal reaction to the
normal operation of an aircraft is not an accident under War-
saw. 6 Thus, when a passenger suffers an in-flight medical emer-
gency due to a stroke or heart attack, it is not generally
considered an accident. Prior to Tseng, the weight of authority
also held that an air carrier's conduct in responding to the med-
ical emergency was not an accident under the Convention.69
The Tseng case has completely changed the playing field.
Prior to that case, if a passenger injured during a flight could
avoid Warsaw, he could probably use state law tort remedies.
Now, if a passenger injured during flight is unable to identify a
Warsaw accident, he probably has no remedy. 0
Gupta v. Austrian Airlinesy1
Two cases, decided in 2002, involving medical emergencies in-
flight, demonstrate that courts are becoming more liberal in the
definition of a Warsaw accident. In Gupta, a passenger suffered
a heart attack and died on a flight between New Delhi and Vi-
enna. Suit was brought against the airline, in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, claiming that the passenger's death was caused,
in part, by inadequate medical equipment on the airplane and
improper training of the flight crew. The airline moved for
summary judgment on the basis that no accident had taken
place within the meaning of the Convention. The court denied
the motion for summary judgment, holding that the "modern
trend" of the law favors the view "that the negligent failure of
the flight crew to serve appropriately the needs of an ailing pas-
senger can constitute an accident under the [Warsaw]
Convention.
72
Husain v. Olympic Airwaysy3
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently adopted a very
broad definition of accident in an unusual case involving the
67 Id. at 136.
68 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 406 (1985).
69 See, e.g., Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130, 132-33 (3d Cir. 1984).
70 El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 176.
71 Gupta v. Austrian Airlines, 211 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (N.D. Il. 2002).
72 Id. at 1079, 1082-83, 1085.
73 Hussain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S.
Ct. 2215 (2003).
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death of a passenger allegedly exposed to second-hand cigarette
smoke. In Husain, a passenger suffering from asthma was seated
three rows ahead of the smoking section on a flight between
Athens and New York. The flight crew ignored repeated pleas
from the passenger and his wife to move away from the smoking
section. The crew erroneously claimed that the flight was full
and refused to help the passengers find someone who might be
willing to switch seats. Halfway through the flight, the asthmatic
passenger suffered a severe attack and died."4
On appeal, the carrier argued that there had been no acci-
dent within the meaning of Warsaw.7 5 The Ninth Circuit dis-
agreed and affirmed the $1.4 million bench verdict against the
airline. The Ninth Circuit held that "[t]he failure to act in the
face of a known, serious risk satisfies the meaning of "accident"
within Article 17, so long as reasonable alternatives exist that
would substantially minimize the risk and implementing these
alternatives would not unreasonably interfere with the normal,
expected operation of the airplane. 76
C. DEFINITION OF EMBARKATION
Marotte v. American Airlines, Inc. 77
The Second and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal reviewed
the Warsaw definition of embarkation this year in two American
Airlines cases. In Marotte, the plaintiff was an elderly gentleman
who claimed to have been punched, tackled, and physically re-
strained by an American supervisor as he attempted to board a
flight from Miami to New York. 78 The Eleventh Circuit adopted
the definition of embarkation used in other circuits, which fo-
cuses on three factors: (1) the passenger's activity at the time of
the accident; (2) the passenger's whereabouts at the time of the
accident; and (3) the amount of control exercised by the carrier
at the moment of injury. Applying these factors to the facts of
the case, the court ruled that the plaintiffs claim was subject to
Warsaw.79
King v. American Airlines, Inc.80
74 Id. at 833-34.
75 Id. at 836.
76 Id. at 837.
77 Marotte v. Ain. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2002).
7s Id. at 1257-58.
79 Id. at 1260-61.
8( King v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 284 F.3d 352, 358-60 (2d Cir. 2002).
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The plaintiffs in King, filed suit when they were bumped from
a flight between Miami and Freeport. At the time they were
bumped, the Kings had been issued boarding passes and were
seated on the bus that was to take them from the terminal to the
aircraft. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
plaintiffs were in the process of embarking on an international
flight and were therefore subject to the Warsaw Convention. In
reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit declined to follow
the rationale of older bumping cases such as Wolgel v. Mexicana
Airlines,"' which placed the claim outside Warsaw because trans-
port was never provided. The Second Circuit implied that this
line of cases did not survive Tseng.s2
D. DEFINITION OF CARRIER
Dazo v. Globe Airport Security Services"'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a narrow defini-
tion of the term carrier in Dazo. This case involved a theft claim
at a security screening checkpoint by a passenger traveling from
San Jose to Toronto. The passenger sued the security company
as well as the carrier. The district court granted summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the passenger was in the course of
embarking on an international flight, and therefore, was subject
to the Warsaw Convention. 4
The Ninth Circuit initially upheld summary judgment in a
published opinion released in 2001. 5 On petition for rehear-
ing, however, the court reversed summary judgment and rein-
stated the claims against the security company. Though the
appeals court acknowledged that previous cases have extended
carrier status to agents of an international airline (including se-
curity companies), the court refused to extend that status here.
In the view of the majority of the Ninth Circuit, a security com-
pany that is a common agent for several airlines on an airport
concourse is not entitled to carrier status under the Conven-
tion.86 The court is somewhat vague in the rationale underlying
S Wolgel v. Mexicana Airlines, 821 F.2d 442, 444-45 (7th Cir. 1987) (ruling
that a flight delay does not fall within the Warsaw Convention).
82 King, 284 F.3d at 362.
83 Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 295 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2001).
84 Id. at 936-37.
85 Dazo v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., 268 F.3d 671, 680-81 (9th Cir. 2001), with-
drawn and superceded by rehearing, 295 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
86 Dazo, 295 F.3d at 939, 941.
7452003]
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
this distinction - a fact that drew a strong dissent from one of
the justices.
The appeals court also disputed whether the services being
performed by the security company were in furtherance of a
contract of carriage on an international flight. 7 This conclu-
sion seems unusual, however, given that the Supreme Court's
decision in Tseng arose from an incident during pre-flight secur-
ity screening. 88
E. FORUM NON CONVENIENS UNDER WARSAW
Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc. 89
Hosaka presents an extensive review of forum non conveniens
under the Warsaw Convention. Plaintiffs were Japanese nation-
als aboard a United Airlines flight from Tokyo to Honolulu that
encountered severe turbulence en route, leading to several inju-
ries and a death. Suit was filed in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, but was dismissed on the grounds that Japan was a more
convenient forum.90
The Warsaw Convention permits suit to be filed where the
carrier is domiciled or has its principal place of business." In
accordance with precedent from the Fifth Circuit,92 however,
the district court held that this venue clause was still subordinate
to the court's power to dismiss in favor of a more convenient
forum overseas.93
The Ninth Circuit performed an extensive review of the his-
tory of the Convention and forum non conveniens. According
to the opinion, forum non conveniens is a common law doctrine
that was rarely employed by the courts of member countries
when the treaty was adopted in 1929 and is an alien concept to
civil jurisdictions.9 4 The Ninth Circuit could find no support in
the language of the treaty, or in its drafting history, for the pro-
position that forum non conveniens could overrule the express
87 Id. at 938-39.
88 See El Al Israel Airlines, 525 U.S. at 163, 166.
89 Hosaka v. United Airlines, Inc., 305 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2002), cert denied 123
S. Ct. 1284 (2003).
99 Id. at 993.
91 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1.
92 In reAir Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9, 1982, 883 F.2d 17,
reinstating 821 F.2d 1147, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding that a court
may apply the doctrine of forum non conveniens in a Warsaw Convention case).
93 Hosaka, 305 F.3d at 993.
94 Id. at 997-99.
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choice of forum clause contained in the Convention." There-
fore, the court concluded that forum non conveniens may not
be used to dismiss a case in favor of a forum in another
country.96
F. CLASS CERTIFICATION OF A WARSAW CLAIM
Lee v. American Airlines, Inc.97
Lee is a case from the Northern District of Texas dealing with
class certification under the Warsaw Convention. The plaintiff
was a passenger aboard an American flight from New York Ken-
nedy to London Heathrow that ook an extended delay at the
gate and was eventually cancelled. Plaintiff brought suit against
American, under Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, for dam-
ages he allegedly sustained as a result of the flight delay. He
thereafter sought class certification on behalf of the 218 other
similarly situated passengers on the flight.9"
The district court performed a lengthy analysis of class certifi-
cation requirements and found that most of those requirements
had been satisfied by the plaintiff.99 One of the requirements
for certification, however, is the existence of common issues of
law and fact between the potential class members. 0 That deter-
mination can be very complex in a Warsaw case. Though the
Warsaw Convention defines liability for a carrier, damages are
calculated using domestic law selected under the forum's choice
of law rules. 10 In Texas, that means the forum with the "most
significant relationship.' 1 2 This requires the court to apply an
individual choice-of-law analysis to each class member's claim
and identify any conflicts in the laws of the various jurisdictions.
Since this particular case involved potential class members from
10 states and 17 countries, the plaintiff was required to provide
the court with an analysis of the variance in pertinent damages
laws among the jurisdictions at issue. The court declined to cer-
95 Id. at 1000-01.
96 Id. at 1000-04.
97 Lee v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. Civ.A.3:01-CV-1179-P, 2002 WL 31230803
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2002).
98 Id. at *1.
99 Id. at *4-9.
100 FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(3).
101 Lee, 2002 WL 31230803, at *11.
102 Id.
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tify the class because that information was not provided in the
plaintiffs motion. 0 '
IV. GARA LITIGATION
Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc."°4
Manufacturers seeking to raise the General Aviation Revitali-
zation Act of 1994 (GARA) as a defense should look closely at a
2002 opinion from the Ninth Circuit. In Estate of Kennedy, suit
was filed on behalf of a pilot who was flying a surplus Huey and
was killed when the Huey self destructed. 105 This particular
Huey was originally manufactured by Bell and delivered to the
U.S. Navy in 1970. The Navy sold the helicopter as military sur-
plus in 1984. The Huey received its first type certification and
airworthiness certificate in 1986.106
In the district court, Bell moved for summary judgment on
the grounds that the helicopter was delivered to its first pur-
chaser, the U.S. Navy, in 1970. GARA's eighteen year statute of
repose would therefore bar the claim. The plaintiff countered
that the statute of repose did not begin to run until 1986, the
date the helicopter received its first type certification for civilian
use and first became a "general aviation aircraft" Under the stat-
ute. 11 7 The district court agreed with the plaintiff and denied
Bell's motion for summary judgment. 1°8
Rather than trying the case and appealing the district court's
decision, Bell filed an interlocutory appeal with the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Interlocutory appeals are rarely permitted, but the Ninth
Circuit held that the GARA statute of repose creates an explicit
statutory right not to stand trial.'0 9 In the Ninth Circuit, a man-
ufacturer appears to have the right to seek immediate appellate
review of a district court's denial of the GARA statute of repose
defense.
Turning to the merits of the case, the Ninth Circ uit con-
cluded that GARA's statute of repose begins to run on the date
any aircraft is first delivered, "even if the aircraft cannot be con-
13 Id. at *12.
104 Estate of Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir.
2002).
05 Id. at 1109.
106 Id. at 1111-12.
10 Id. at 1112.
08 Id. at 1109.
109 Id. at 1111.
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sidered a general aviation aircraft at that time."'1 1" Since the he-
licopter was first delivered to the Navy in 1970, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court's denial of summary judgment and
dismissed the plaintiff's claims against Bell.' 1
Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp.' 12
The application of GARA to purchasers of an aircraft type cer-
tificate was examined in 2002 by the Supreme Court of Iowa in
Mason. The plaintiff was injured in the crash of a Hughes 269A,
manufactured and sold in 1968. The type certificate on the 269
product line was acquired by Schweizer in 1986 from McDon-
nell Douglas. Though Schweizer never manufactured a 269A, it
manufactures C and D models and provides maintenance sup-
port materials for the 269A, including maintenance manual
updates. 3
The plaintiff brought suit against Schweizer in two capacities:
as the manufacturer of the 269A by virtue of its purchase of the
type certificate, and as the publisher of 269A maintenance
manuals that were allegedly defective for failing to warn of com-
ponent defects that led to the crash of this particular helicopter.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Schweizer
on all claims, based on GARA's eighteen year statute of
repose. 14
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Iowa upheld the dismissal
of claims against Schweizer in its capacity as a manufacturer. To
the extent Schweizer acquired the status of manufacturer by
purchasing the type certificate, it should also be extended the
protection of GARA.1 1 5
Once the court decided that GARA applied to Schweizer, it
also upheld the dismissal of the failure to warn claim arising
from Schweizer's publication of the maintenance manual. In
the court's view, maintenance manuals are part of the aircraft
itself, and thus failure to warn claims relating to maintenance
manuals are claims made against a defendant in its capacity as
manufacturer. Therefore, GARA's eighteen-year statute of re-
pose affords protection to the successor of the manufacturer. '"
110 Id. at 1112.
III Id.
112 Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., 653 N.W.2d 543 (Iowa 2002).
113 Id. at 545.
114 Id. at 546.
115 Id. at 549-50.
116 Id. at 550-52.
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V. PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING UNDER
FEDERAL AVIATION STATUTES
AND REGULATIONS
In 2001, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an opinion in Alexan-
der v. Sandoval, making clear that private causes of action to en-
force federal laws must be created by Congress." 7 According to
Sandoval, a federal statute must contain text displaying an intent
by Congress to create not just a private right, but also a private
remedy.' 18 If that intent cannot be found in the text of the stat-
ute, a private cause of action does not exist, "no matter how de-
sirable that might be as a policy matter or how compatible a
private remedy might be with the statute."' 119 The Sandoval opin-
ion has had significant impact in several aviation cases this year
where plaintiffs have attempted to assert private causes of action
under federal statutes.
A. AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT
In Love v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that the
Air Carrier Access Act (ACAA) does not create a private cause of
action. 12 In Love, the plaintiff became ill during flight and was
unable to walk to the lavatory, having to be carried there instead
by her son. The plaintiff alleged that Delta violated the ACAA
by failing to provide an aisle chair to assist her in reaching the
lavatory, failing to provide adequately trained personnel, and
because the lavatory was too small. The plaintiff sought com-
pensatory and punitive damages, as well as a permanent injunc-
tion, requiring Delta to provide aisle chairs in-flight, install
larger lavatories, and train its personnel to better assist handi-
capped passengers.12' The district court held that, while the
plaintiff was not entitled to seek monetary relief, the ACAA im-
plies a private cause of action for declaratory and injunctive re-
lief. The court granted Delta leave, however, to seek
interlocutory review of the issue. 122
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals examined
the legislative history of the ACAA in the context of the Sandoval
117 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
I's Id.
119 Id. at 286-87.
120 Love v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 310 F.3d 1347, 1351 (1lth Cir. 2002).
121 Id. at 1350-51.
122 Id. at 1351.
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opinion. 123 The Eleventh Circuit noted that the statute creates a
comprehensive enforcement scheme through administrative
procedures in the Department of Transportation (DOT).124
This administrative framework expressly creates an enforcement
mechanism that can be initiated by a disabled person filing a
complaint with the DOT.1 25 The fact that Congress had ex-
pressly provided private litigants with this administrative action
powerfully suggested to the Eleventh Circuit that Congress did
not intend to provide other private rights of action. 12 6 Finding
no language in the statute that displayed an intent by Congress
to create a private cause of action, the Eleventh Circuit held that
no private cause of action exists under the ACAA. 12 7
B. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
In Casas v. American Airlines, Inc., the Fifth Circuit addressed
private causes of action under the Airline Deregulation Act
(ADA) in the wake of Sandoval. 21 The plaintiff in Casas brought
suit for loss of a video camera in checked luggage, claiming in
part that he had a private cause of action for the loss under
regulations adopted pursuant to the ADA. 129 The regulations at
issue prohibit an airline from limiting its liability for lost luggage
to an amount less than $1250.13° The district court held that the
ADA implies such a private cause of action where the carrier
seeks to limit its loss to an amount less than $1250.13 1
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the San-
doval factors and could find no language in the ADA evidencing
an intent on the part of Congress to create a private remedy.
Further, the court noted that Congress adopted a comprehen-
sive enforcement procedure under the ADA, strongly suggesting
that it did not intend to create a private cause of action. 32 This
opinion was issued prior to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Love, but the rationale in the two cases is identical. Thus, Casas
should be very persuasive authority for a litigant arguing that
123 Id. at 1353.
124 Id. at 1354.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 1354, 1357.
127 Id. at 1359.
128 Casas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 304 F.3d 517 (5th Cir. 2002).
129 Id. at 519.
130 14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (1984), amended by 14 C.F.R. § 254.4 (1999).
131 Casas, 304 F.3d at 520.
132 Id. at 522-23.
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the Fifth Circuit has effectively abandoned its position in
Shinault v. American Airlines, Inc.,' 3 and that the Fifth Circuit no
longer recognizes a private cause of action under the ACAA.
C. FAA SECURITY REGULATIONS
In the case of TWU Local 555 v. Southwest Airlines Co., a South-
west Airlines union brought suit to challenge any attempt by the
company to discipline or discharge employees based on infor-
mation uncovered in criminal background checks."' Under the
terms of the newly enacted Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, carriers are required to conduct a Criminal History Record
Check on all current and prospective employees.' 35 Should the
record check disclose that the employee has been convicted of
any of the 28 listed offenses within the previous ten years, that
person is no longer qualified to have unescorted access to an
aircraft or to a secure area of an airport.'3 6
The union brought suit to prevent Southwest from using in-
formation obtained through the Criminal History Record Check
to discipline or discharge employees convicted of offenses
outside the ten year period or not specifically listed as disqualify-
ing by the Act. The union claimed that a private cause of action
existed to enforce the specific terms of the Act, which it alleged
Southwest was exceeding.'3 7
The district court examined the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act in light of the Sandoval opinion and was unable to
find anything in the Act suggesting that Congress expressly or
impliedly authorized a private cause of action. The court dis-
missed the suit and held that there is no private federal cause of
action to enforce FAA regulations concerning employment
background checks.' 8
VI. GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE CASES
Densenberger v. United Technologies Corp.'39
133 Shinault v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 936 F.2d 796, 804 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding
that private causes of action are allowed under the ACAA because Congress did
not expressly restrict the remedies under the ACAA).
134 TWU Local 555 v. Southwest Airlines Co., No. Civ.A. 3:302-CV-0554P, 2002
WL 31245372, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 1, 2002).
135 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44936(a), (b) (1) (A).
13-, See 49 U.S.C. § 44936(b) (1) (A).
137 TWU Local 555, 2002 WL 31245372, at *1-2.
138 Id. at *3.
139 Densenberger v. United Techs. Corp., 297 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2002).
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In Densberger, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals examined
the scope of the government contractor defense in failure to
warn cases.1 40 The matter arose when a Blackhawk helicopter
operated by the U.S. Army crashed while landing as the pilot
was executing a shallow right turn to line up with the pad. The
pilot was unable to level the helicopter, which turned steeply to
the right, completing a 360 degree turn and crashed on its right
side. Post-accident investigation suggested that the crash was
caused by unequal fuel loads in the auxiliary external tanks.
One tank was nearly empty, while the other was nearly full.141
Following an eleven day trial, ajury awarded plaintiffs $23 mil-
lion, finding that United Technologies was negligent for failing
to warn the Army that the helicopter could become uncontrolla-
ble during foreseeable flight conditions. United Technologies
appealed the verdict, in part on the grounds that it was entitled
to immunity as a government contractor. 14 2
It was undisputed that the Blackhawk helicopter was manufac-
tured for the U.S. Army, which was heavily involved in its devel-
opment and testing. 143 On appeal, however, the Second Circuit
expressed considerable doubt that the government contractor
defense was even relevant to the case.' 44 The Second Circuit
narrowly applies the government contractor defense in failure
to warn cases. The defense is implicated in the Second Circuit
only where it involves the content of warnings meant to accom-
pany the product itself. 4 5 Since the issue in this case involved
the sufficiency of warnings given to the Government by the man-
ufacturer, the government contractor defense was not impli-
cated under Second Circuit precedent.'46
Hall v. Raytheon Aircraft147
A very different approach to failure to warn government con-
tractor cases was illustrated by the Western District of Michigan
in Hall.148 This was a wrongful death action arising from the
crash of a modified Beech King Air being operated by the Army
140 Id. at 68.
141 Id. at 69.
142 Id.
143 Id. at 68.
144 Id. at 75.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Hall v. Raytheon Aircraft, No. 1:01-CV-221, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9219
(W.D. Mich. May 15, 2002).
148 Id.
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for electronic reconnaissance. Plaintiffs brought suit against
Raytheon, claiming that design defects caused the RC-12K
Guardrail aircraft to enter an unrecoverable spin.'49
Raytheon moved for summary judgment based on the govern-
ment contractor defense and plaintiffs responded that the RC-
12K was essentially an "off the shelf' King Air and that the de-
sign defects were inherent to the aircraft, existing in civilian ver-
sions as well. 50 Plaintiffs also argued that Raytheon failed to
warn the Government that the aircraft could become uncontrol-
lable during foreseeable flight conditions (which is the same ar-
gument made by plaintiffs in the Densberger case)."'
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ray-
theon.1 52 With respect to the claim that the aircraft was an "off
the shelf' version, the court noted that there was a great deal of
uncontroverted evidence in the record showing that the Army
had participated extensively in the design of the RC-12K and
that it was very different from a standard King Air.151 On the
failure to warn claim, the court held that Raytheon's duty to
warn the Government was a duty to warn of dangers known to
Raytheon, but not known to the Government. The court could
find no evidence in the record to controvert Raytheon's position
that the Government was equally knowledgeable as to all risks
inherent in the operation of the aircraft. 154
VII. AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND SYSTEM
STABILIZATION ACT CASES
Eleven days after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, President Bush signed into law the Air Transportation
Safety and System Stabilization Act.155 As part of the legislation,
Congress created a federal cause of action for damages arising
out of the September 11 th hijackings and subsequent crashes. 15 6
The Act also sets original and exclusive jurisdiction for all suits
in the Southern District of New York. 157 The first few opinions
149 Id. at *1, *34.
150 Id. at *5, *15.
151 Id. at *5.
152 Id. at *37.
153 Id. at *18.
154 Id. at *29, *30-31.
155 Air Transportation Safety and Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115
Stat. 230 (2001).
156 Id. § 408(b)(1).
157 Id. § 408(b) (3).
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arising under this comprehensive legislation have all involved
the scope of this new federal cause of action.
730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. Assurance Co. of American
International S
Three cases in 2002 involve insurance disputes arising from
September 11th claims. In 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd., the plain-
tiff filed suit against its insurer in the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana seeking business interruption benefits under its CGL policy.
The business interruption loss stemmed from the closure of U.S.
airports beginning on September l1th. 159
The defendant insurer moved the court to transfer venue to
the Southern District of New York, contending that exclusive ju-
risdiction of the claim was in that court since it arose out of the
September lth hijackings. The district court examined the
statute and held that, while the September 11 th attacks were im-
plicated by the plaintiff s claim, it was primarily a breach of con-
tract suit and the motion to transfer was denied.
60
Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckerversicherung6'
The Southern District of New York granted a motion to dis-
miss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in Canada Life Assur-
ance Co. 1 6 2 The case involved a claim by one re-insurer seeking
indemnity from another for payment of numerous September
11th life insurance claims. Suit was filed in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York by Canada Life on the basis that the dispute
arose from the September 11th attacks. 63
The court examined the Stabilization Act and its legislative
history in detail and held that it did not have jurisdiction over
this particular dispute because while the Act may apply broadly
to actions filed by individual victims of September 11 th, it did
not encompass contractual disputes between re-insurers.' 64
Goodrich Corp. v. Winterthur International America Insurance
Co. 165
158 730 Bienville Partners, Ltd. v. Assurance Co. of Am. Int'l, No. Civ.A. 02-
0106, 2002 WL 985809 (E.D. La. Apr. 16, 2002), afffd, No. 02-31071, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 8570 (5th Cir. Apr. 29, 2003).
159 Id. at *1.
160 Id. at *2.
161 Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Ruckerversicherung, 210 F. Supp.
2d 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), affd, 335 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2003).
162 Id. at 323-24.
163 Id. at 325.
164 Id. at 327, 330.
165 Goodrich Corp. v. Winterthur Int'l Am. Ins. Co., No. 5:02CV367, 2002 WL
31833646 (N.D. Ohio June 17, 2002).
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Goodrich Corp. involved another coverage dispute between an
insured and its insurer over a business interruption claim.'66
The insured asserted a claim for loss of revenue stemming from
the cancellation of orders for aerospace goods and services fol-
lowing September l1th. The defendant insurer moved to dis-
miss or transfer venue to the Southern District of New York
based on the exclusive jurisdiction clause of the Stabilization
Act. 167
The district court in Ohio examined the history and purpose
of the Act. Citing* the previous decisions in Bienville and Canada
Life, the court held that Congress did not intend the Stabiliza-
tion Act to apply to disputes between an insured and its insurer
over the coverage available under an insurance policy. 168 Conse-
quently, the defendant's motion to dismiss or transfer venue was
denied. 6 9
Graybill v. City of New York171
On September 11, 2002, the Southern District of New York
issued an opinion recognizing that the Stabilization Act was
passed in great haste and contains certain ambiguities that can-
not be clarified by its scant legislative history in Graybill.171 The
suit was filed in state court by a construction worker who was
injured during clean-up at the World Trade Center site and the
case was removed by the defendant to the Southern District of
New York based on the Stabilization Act. 17 2
In its opinion, the court struggled with the fact that the Act
creates a federal cause of action for damages arising out of the
hijackings and crashes, yet confers exclusive jurisdiction on the
Southern District of New York for all actions resulting from or re-
lating to the crashes. 7 3 "Arising out of' and "resulting from and
relating to" are not synonymous phrases, and legislative history
does not explain why different language was used.'74 Argu-
ments could be made that one phrase is broader or narrower
than the other.
166 Id. at *1.
167 Id.
168 Id. at *4-5.
I-) Id. at *6.
174 Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
171 Id. at 346, 350.
172 Id. at 346.
173 Id. at 349.
174 Id. at 350.
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The Southern District of New York concluded that the ambi-
guity could not be resolved using ordinary statutory interpreta-
tion. It therefore decided that "a line must be drawn" to
separate those claims Congress intended to reach with the Stabi-
lization Act from those it intended to exclude. 75 The line the
court drew was based on the tort concept of proximate cause.
Any claim that is both caused in fact and a foreseeable result of
the events on September l1th is covered by the Stabilization
Act. As in tort law, superceding, intervening events break the
chain of causation and place a claim outside the Act.
1 76
In this particular case, the Southern District of New York con-
cluded that plaintiffs claims were too remote from the events of
September 11 th. 7 7 The plaintiff was injured in an accident that
was common to construction sites. The alleged negligence of
the site-owners was a superceding, intervening cause that would
break any chain of causation.
1 78
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS AVIATION LITIGATION
A. CIVIL RIGHTS
United Airlines and the City of Los Angeles were sued by a
passenger in California for an alleged civil rights violation stem-
ming from a manual search of his bag. The incident giving rise
to Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc.,179 took place in 1998 when the
plaintiff passed through United's security checkpoint at the Los
Angeles airport. The plaintiff placed his bag on the x-ray belt
and he proceeded through the metal detector. His bag went
through the x-ray machine without exciting any particular suspi-
cion. On the other side of the checkpoint, the plaintiff was ad-
vised that his bag had been selected for random search. The
plaintiff refused to consent to the search, at which point a police
officer was summoned. The police officer told the plaintiff that
he was not free to leave the area until his bag had been
searched. The plaintiff agreed and the subsequent search re-
vealed nothing of significance. 8 °
After returning from his trip, the plaintiff filed suit for alleged
violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unrea-
175 Id.
176 Id. at 351.
177 Id. at 351-52.
178 Id.
179 Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2002).
180 Id. at 1087-88.
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sonable search and seizure. This claim was dismissed by the dis-
trict court.1 8 1 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff impliedly consented to further search
when he placed his bag on the conveyor belt. Unless and until
an x-ray scan is able to rule out every possibility of dangerous
contents, manual search of screened bags is permitted by the
Fourth Amendment. 182
B. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
United States v. Cothran"'3 is a good illustration of the fact that
false statements can get you in a great deal of trouble. The inci-
dent giving rise to this criminal prosecution took place in 1999
when the defendant telephoned the U.S. Airways reservation of-
fice in Pittsburgh. In the course of his conversation, the defen-
dant stated that he was upset with U.S. Airways for not letting
him bring explosives on the plane and that he wanted to blow-
up an airplane at 35,000 feet. Subsequently, he told the agent
that he was merely joking.8 4
At trial, the only evidence of the exact statement by the defen-
dant was the testimony of the reservation agent. After the pas-
senger made the alleged statement, the agent pressed the
emergency recording button on her phone set. This recording
did not pick up the threatening statement, but it did record the
passengers' laughter and subsequent statement that he was
merely joking.18 5
The defendant was convicted by the jury for falsely conveying
his intent to carry explosives aboard a plane and he was sen-
tenced to ten months in federal prison and three years of proba-
tion. 86 His conviction was upheld on appeal to the Third
Circuit.'87
C. CONSULTING EXPERT DISQUALIFICATION
Texas practitioners may want to review a case out of the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals entitled In re Bell Helicopter Textron,
is, Id. at 1088-89.
182 Id. at 1089-90.
183 United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2002).
184 Id. at 175.
183 Id. at 176.
186 Id. at 174.
187 Id.
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Inc.'8 8 This was a mandamus action filed by Bell seeking disqual-
ification of plaintiffs' counsel. The underlying lawsuit arose
from the crash of a Bell 412 in Cuernavaca, Mexico. Plaintiffs'
counsel had employed a consulting expert in the case who was a
former Bell employee. This former employee worked for Bell
between 1977 and 1987 in a variety of safety and development
positions, eventually becoming Chief of Flight Safety. During
her employment with Bell, she worked with the company's in-
house and outside counsel in the defense of product liability
actions, including actions arising from 412 crashes.8 9
In moving to disqualify, Bell presented evidence that plain-
tiffs' consulting expert was present at numerous meetings with
Bell's counsel where legal strategy was discussed, including strat-
egy in suits involving the 412.190 The court of appeals held that
Bell's evidence was sufficient to raise a conclusive presumption
that confidences and secrets were imparted to the former
employee. 191
Because the former employee was not a lawyer, the fact that
she is deemed to be in possession of confidential information is
not necessarily disqualifying. Plaintiffs could retain her services
as a consulting expert in cases against her former employer as
lohg as they strictly adhered to a screening process and as long
as no confidential information was actually conveyed by the con-
sultant to plaintiffs' counsel.192 The screening process requires
the following steps:
a) The newly hired consultant must be cautioned not to dis-
close any information relating to the representation of her
former employer;
b) The consultant must be instructed not to work on any mat-
ter on which she worked during the prior employment, or
which she has information relating to the former em-
ployer's representation;
c) The hiring firm should take other reasonable steps to en-
sure that the non-lawyer does not work in connection with
matters on which she worked during the prior
employment. 19 3
188 In re Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 87 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
2002, no pet. h.).
189 Id. at 139-44.
190 Id. at 144.
191 Id. at 147.
192 Id. at 145-46.
193 Id. at 147.
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Though Bell presented no direct evidence that confidential
information had been conveyed, and plaintiffs' counsel pro-
vided evidence that they complied with the screening require-
ments, the court of appeals concluded that the consultant's
former position and duties made it impossible for her to be ef-
fectively screened.' 94 As a consulting expert in a 412 case, she
would be required to work on the other side of litigation that is
substantially related to litigation on which she previously worked
while in Bell's employ. 19 5
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, the disqualification of their con-
sultant is imputed to their attorneys. Thus, the court of appeals
granted mandamus, directing the trial court to enter an order
disqualifying the expert and plaintiffs' counsel from further repre-
sentation in the case.1 96
D. INSURANCE COVERAGE - PASSENGER SUB-LIMIT
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case recently
under Colorado law that very narrowly defined the passenger
sub-limit on an aviation policy. In Old Republic Insurance Co. v.
Durango Air Services, Inc., the underlying claim arose from a gen-
eral aviation accident in which the pilot and two passengers
were killed.'97 Following the accident, wrongful death suits were
filed against several insureds of Old Republic by the estates of
the passengers. 98 Old Republic insured the defendants under a
standard aviation liability policy with limits of $100,000 per pas-
senger and $1,000,000 per occurrence. Old Republic offered to
settle the passenger claims for $100,000 each, but this offer was
declined. The insureds thereafter confessed judgment in Colo-
rado state court in the amount of $4.05 million. Old Republic
tendered $200,000, representing its sub-limit for passengers,
and filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court.'99
At the trial court level, the insureds successfully contended
that the passenger sub-limit does not apply to mental anguish
claims asserted by survivors of the decedents. Combining the
passenger claims with the claims of surviving family members,
194 Id.
195 Id. at 148.
-,i Id. at 151.
11)7 Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Durango Air Servs., Inc., 283 F.3d 1222, 1223 (10th
Cir. 2002).
198 Id.
199 Id. at 1223-24, 1226.
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the district court held that Old Republic was required to indem-
nify the insureds for $700,000 under the aviation policy. 20 0
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision of the trial court.
20 1
Noting that the aviation policy insured against bodily injury
claims by non-passengers, and that the policy definition of bod-
ily injury includes mental anguish, the Tenth Circuit focused on
the exact language describing the $100,000 passenger sub-
limit.20 2 This limitation applied to damages because of bodily
injury to passengers. The Tenth Circuit interpreted this limita-
tion as applying only to claims made by passengers. Without
much discussion, the court rejected the argument that mental
anguish claims by family members of passengers are necessarily
the result of the passengers' injuries.20 3
XI. CONCLUSION
Courts and aviation litigants in 2002 continued to struggle
with the existence and scope of complete preemption under the
Federal Aviation Act of 1958, the Airline Deregulation Act, and
the Warsaw Convention. In general terms, aviation defendants
fared better in the Second and Third Circuits on complete pre-
emption removals. On the other hand, the Ninth Circuit has
rejected complete preemption removal under the Airline Der-
egulation Act.
In Warsaw litigation, there was a continued effort by claimants
in 2002 to expand the types of claims covered by the Conven-
tion. This is most likely a consequence of the U.S. Supreme
Court's 1999 decision in Tseng, which effectively barred any
other bodily injury claim arising from international air transpor-
tation that was not covered by the Warsaw Convention.
A very significant GARA decision came out of the Ninth Cir-
cuit in 2002, interpreting the Act as a statute of repose rather
than a statute of limitation. This permits interlocutory appeal
(at least in the Ninth Circuit) of a trial court's decision not to
apply GARA. The favorable outcome for manufacturers in
GARA litigation in 2002 was offset by a significant loss in the
Second Circuit on a government contractor defense case. The
Second Circuit interpreted the scope of the defense in such a
way that it may be very difficult to apply in failure to warn cases.
200 Id. at 1224, 1228.
201 Id. at 1227.
202 Id. at 1227-28.
203 Id.
2003]
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Finally, in 2002, the Eleventh Circuit rejected a claim for dam-
ages based on an alleged violation of the Air Carrier Access Act.
Applying new precedent from the U.S. Supreme Court, the Elev-
enth Circuit held that there is no private cause of action under
the Act.
Transcript
0 4LAS. It*
